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The purpose of this research investigation was to analyze the effects
of environment, tonography, geometry, and highway and rail traffic patterns
with respect to rail-highway grade crossing accidents in rural areas.
The mathematical tools of factor analysis and regression analysis
•-ere used to develop models for Dredicting the relative hazard at a rail-
road grade crossing. These models are based on rail volume, highway
volume, and roadside distractions, such as houses, businesses and advertis-
ing signs. To evaluate the proposed mathematical relationships, it was
necessary to collect sufficient data on many variables deemed to have an
influence on safety. Therefore, 56 variables were measured at tho 239
accident locations and 23 variables at the 2U-1 non-accident locations.
Previous research efforts were concerned either with long period
accident experience or with before- and- after studies of tho various protec-
tion devices. In this research, locations which experienced accidents in
a two-year period were compared to non-accident locations. The results of





The motor vehicle-train accident, though infrequent, is the most
severe in terms of fatalities, personal injuries and prooerty damage per
accident of all types experienced on American highways. This type of
accident, however, cpn be eliminated only by closing all crossings to
highway traffic or by construction grade separations for all rail-highway
crossings.
The delay and congestion resulting from the first alternative obvious-
ly would not be tolerated by the motoring public. Based on pt\ estimated
cost of separation improvements in Ohio, it would cost $5 billion to con-
struct grade separations at the 10,800 grade crossings in the State of
Indiana. (28)
Another alternative is to install modern flashing lights with short
arm gates at all crossings. Such an undertaking is estimated to reduce
the number of pccidents by a considerable amount, but the cost would be
in excess of $150 million. (28) This figure is more realistic but still
represents an enormous sum of money. Furthermore, the expenditure of this
amount of money might well be more efficiently used for the prevention of
other types of accidents.
During 1962 and 1963, 1^9 people were killed in motor vehicle-train
accidents in Indiana. This figure accounts for 6.0 percent of the total
highway fatalities but only 0.*+ percent of the total number of accidents.
(17) The severity of these accidents is of general concern to the public
and is invariably well publicized.
The national trend for rail-highway grade crossing accidents is
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decreasing, but the reverse is true in Indiana. Based en data cerapiled
by the Interstate Ceramerce Ceramissien at the clese ef 1953 » the numbers
ef grade crossing accidents and fatalities in Indiana were emeng the
highest in the natien. Indiana was exceeded only by the State ef Arkansas
in grade crossing accidents per million cars registered and grade cross-
ing deaths per million cars registered. (28)
The present warrants as specified by the Indiana State Highway Com-
mission for the protection of highway-rail grade crossings are as follows:
a) "Two or more main line tracks should be protected by flashing
lights and short arm gates;
b) Where train speeds are 70 mph or greater on single line tracks,
flashing lights and short arm gates should be used; and
c) All other crossings are protected by flashing lights except
those where there is good sight distance in all quadrants and
where either the highway traffic is less than 500 vehicles per
day (ADT), or rail traffic less than 6 trains per day (TPD).
These latter crossings are protected by reflectori zed crossbucks
and advance warning signs." (26)
These general warrants do not result in priority ratings based on hazard.
The priority for improving crossing protection at rail-highway intersec-
tions is left to subjective judgment.
In a recent report by the Interstate Commerce Commission based en
data submitted by the railroads, Henry Vinskey concluded that the major
cause of rail-highway grade crossing accidents is the failure ©f motor-
vehicle drivers to yield to trains. (20) The purpose of this research
study was to investigate existing conditions which might have encouraged
drivers not to take reasonable precautions. The study constitutes an
analysis of highway-rail grade crossing accidents with respect to the
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effects of environment, crossing geometry, highway and rail traffic
patterns, existing protective devices, and other relevant elements and
their relative importance as a basis for determining a more effective
and economic means of establishing the necessary railroad crossing protec-
tion.
In this study, mathematical models were developed to predict the
relative hazard of rail-highway grade crossings for various types of
crossing conditions and protection. Priority ratings based on this model
or the significant hazards determined in its development would permit a
wiser determination of the most needed improvements for rail-highway grade
crossings.
Because of the large number of crossings and the high costs involved,
it is not economically possible to eliminate all crossings or even provide
all crossings with the most effective types of protection. The develop-
ment of a method for establishing priorities among grade crossing projects
is necessary because the amount of total expenditure is dependent upon the
tax burden which the public is willing to assume.
Known accident locations and non-accident locations in rural areas
were analysed to develop correlations for the study variables. Factor
analysis and regression analysis were the analytical techniques employed.
The principal concern of factor analysis is to resolve a set of variables
linearly into a smeller number of factors. As a result, factor analysis
often permits a simple interpretation of a given array of data and may
afford a simplified description of the particular set of variables
analysed. (29) Regression analysis provides a quantitative description
of a dependent variable as it is functionally related to the independent
variables.
Proper use of the mathematical models developed in this study permit:
1. An estimation of hazard at a rail-highway grade crossing, and
2. A basis for establishing a priority program for improving pro-
tection.
In this study, theoretical methods were applied to practical condi-
tions. The results are based on a scientific analysis end not on subjec-
tive judgment, and a better understanding of rail-highway grade crossing




In 1878 , there were 191 railroad grade crossing accidents and 98
accompanying deaths reported for a seven-year period in the State of
Massachusetts. Daring 1890 » ^02 persons were killed and 6?5 were injured
in the United States as a result of vehicle-train accidents. (9) These
dates indicate that railway grade crossing accidents were a problem even
before the advent of the motor vehicle. Authors, engineers, public
officials, and railroad men have concerned themselves with safe railroad
operation since 1830 when the Baltimore and Ohio operated the first
common-carrier service. (14)
Type of Protection
The introduction of the automobile on American roads and highways
during the early 1900 , s resulted in even more accidents and emphasized
the need for improved crossing protection. Many types of protective
devices were installed and evaluated. Among these were crossbucks, bells,
wig-wags, lights, rotating disks, flashing lights, watchmen, and gates. (12)
Even a cable barrier was tested in Chicago, Illinois, in 1921. (9)
Only three devices are substantially used today for rural crossings.
The crossbuck is the only protection given to drivers at 80 percent of
the 225 t000 grade crossings located in the United States. The next most
common protective device is a flasher consisting of a flashing light with
a bell. Automatic gates which lower and block vehicular traffic a minimum
of 20 seconds prior to the arrival of the fastest train affords the most
positive separation of highway and railroad traffic for at-grade loca-
tions.
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The ultimate in protection is, of course, the grade separation. An
average cost of each necessary structure is presently estimated at
$350,000. (28)
The crossbuck only indicates the presence of a railroad crossing.
The flasher and automatic gates warn the motorists that a train is approach-
ing. The effectiveness of the bell has been questioned, but undoubtedly
some motorists are attracted by the noise when visibility of the flashing
light is limited by reflected or direct sunlight. (32)
Realizing that the crossbuck is the basic warning device used at
most crossings, T. M. Vanderstemple investigated the influence of various
types of paint and reflective materials on the desirable properties list-
ed below:
1. Reflection of light back to the approaching vehicle,
2. Ease of cleaning,
3. Reflective properties when wet,
^. Cost, and
5. Service life.
Vanderstemple concluded that reflectorized materials were far superior to
any painted surface.
Stop signs and traffic signals have been incorporated at some cross-
ings. The stop sign directs all vehicles to stop before proceeding, and
the traffic signal can be automatically operated in conjunction with the
approach of a train. In recent testimony before the Interstate Commerce
Commission, G. H. Wyatt disclosed the results of experimentation with
such protective devices in Michigan. Justification for such installa-
tions was based on the concept that such signs as caution, yield right-
of-way, slow, and railroad crossing cause no immediate reaction, but the
traffic signal and the stop sign do produce positive driver responses.
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fear of arrest was considered the primary reason for this beh'vior.
Comparative figures Indies ted a 6 to 1 ratio of accident reduction in
favor of the traffic signal when compared to similar crossings protected
by flashers.
Stoo signs have been placed at grade rail-crossings on sore second-
ary roads. To determine the merits of claims that neoole do not stop for
such signs and thus become contemptuous of all stoD signs, Wyatt (M ) re-
sorted that observations of several installations disclosed that 93 oercent of
all drivers either stopped or slowed to SDeeds of less th^n 5 moh. He also
noted that another recent study confirmed these results and that in one study
of stop signs on low volume roads, accidents were reduced by 80 to 90 oercent
while in another study, the reduction amounted to 72 percent. Several other
authors advocate the use of stop signs to protect the highway traffic aoproach-
ing at-grade railroad crossings. (2, 5» 23, 28)
Protection Coefficients
Protection coefficients are comparative numerical ratings of the
measure of protection afforded by the various protection devices. The
results of the several studies which have developed orotection coeffi-
cients are summarized below.
1. L. E. Peabody and T. P. Dimmick, in a 19^1 study oerformed by
the Division of Transport, Public Roads Administration, col-
lected data on 3»5^3 crossings in 29 stptes for a five-year
study period. The protection coefficients calculated for the
various types of crossings were based on the following emperi-
cal formula relating the protection coefficients to exposure
units and accident experience: (31)
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where P the protection coefficient for a type of protection,
N the number of crossings in a type group,
H = the daily highway traffic volume at each crossing,
T = daily train traffic volume at each crossing, and
A = number of accidents.




2. Harold Marks summarized the results of three studies. The first
study was based on a 20-year before-and-after analysis of ^9
crossings where the protection was changed to gates. Data were
taken from the files of the Public Utilities Commission and
represented crossings in Los Angeles County. Because of the
metropolitan character of Los Angeles County, these crossings
were primarily located in urbanized areas. The change in protec-
tion from crossbucks to gates resulted in a 91 percent reduction
in fatalities and 85 percent in personal injuries.
The second study reported by Marks was an Illinois study
X of 23 gate locations on the Grand Trunk Western Railroad.
Fatalities were reduced 93 percent and injuries 98 percent from
those at the crossings with crossbucks.
A third study of 35 crossings on the Main Line, San
Francisco to San Jose, disclosed that the installation of gates
reduced accidents from those with crossbucks by 80 percent,
fatalities by 9^ percent, and injuries by 95 percent.
Using the reduction in fatalities as a comparative base,
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Crossbucks 1 1 1
Flashers 3.5
Gates 11 14 5
3. T. M. Chubb reported the results of a study in which crossbuck
protection was changed to flasher protection in the City of
Los Angeles. Approximately 400 crossing-years experience showed
a reduction in accidents of 76 percent end fatalities more than
85 percent. Based on the reduction in fatalities, flashers re-
sulted in 6.7 times fewer deaths than did the crossbucks. (U)
4. W. J. Hedley investigated 321 crossings in the State of Indiana
for a 20-year period, 1920-1940. Based on a reduction in acci-
dents after a change in crossing protection, the following pro-




5. C. McEachem in a four-year study of 190 accident locations in
Houston, Texas, developed the following coefficients based on




6. The Oregon State Highway Department concluded a five-year study
of 378 accident crossings in 195C Protection coefficients were
calculated using the relationship between rail and highway
3S
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volumes and the accident experiences of the various protection




These coefficients represent the results of before-and-after or
accident experience studied at railroad grade crossings. They are sum-
marized in Table 1 after setting the value for crossbucks at unity, with
higher values indicating increased safety.
Influencing Variables
One motor vehicle and one train arriving at a grade crossing at or
about the same time are required for an accident. Therefore, the two most
obvious variables which affect the potential for an accident are vehicle
and train volumes. The type or degree of protection may also be important.
Early research and hazard formulas were based on these three variables.
The Peabody and Dimmick study, for example, investigated traffic
volumes, sight distances, vertical and horizontal alinement, surface types,
and number of tracks. Only train and highway volumes and the type of pro-
tection were significantly related to the number of accidents. This study
analysed 1,25^ crossings of which more than 60 percent were in urban loca-
tions. (5)
F. B. Crandall of the Oregon State Highway Department found that
nighttime accidents were *K) percent more likely to occur than daytime
accidents. (30) In consideration of this fact, nighttime traffic volumes
were increased by 40 percent in applying the developed hazard formula.
The formula also considered the past accident experience of the crossing
under investigation.
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the following variables were significant at the one percent level of
significance: (7)
1. Number of tracks,
2. Type of highway surface,





8. Rail volume, and
9. Type of protection.
The horizontal alinements of the highway and the railroad had no signifi-
cant influence on the safety of grade crossings.
Chubb points out that such variables as illumination, distractive
influences, and visibility may also influence hazard at a crossing. How-
ever, these variables are extremely difficult to measure quantitatively. (9)
Hazard Indices
Many indices of hazard have been developed as a result of the studies
previously mentioned. A hazard index is a relative measure of hazard at
a crossing as expressed by the influencing variables included in the
equation. The formulas presented below have been reduced to common nota-
tion which is defined in Table 2. The first eight formulas were summarized
by Karks. (2*0
1. California Public Utilities Commission Accident Formula
(5-year basis):
IH = A + I + 2K
11
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2. Illinois Commerce Commission (Warren Henry):
IH VR(1 Q + ^ + D)
3. City of Detroit (adapted to California conditions);
4. Federal Aid Highway Deficiency Study:
IH = VR/1000
5. Los Angeles Grade Crossing Committee:
IH = JL_ [P + 10(T + S)l
1000 l J




+ RZ) (MlK A)CG)
7. State of Oregon (19^1):
IH = VR(US + RsHl + A)
8. California Department of Public Works and Public Utilities
Commission:
IH = VRAG
9. Utah-Idaho State Highway Department: (26)
IH=VR(T1 + S + An «^N+M)
10. State of Oregon: (30)
IH = VRGDA
11. Arkansas State Highway Department: (26)
IH = VR (A + G)
12. Iowa State Highway Department: (22)





























accidents or accident factor
intersection angle factor
attention or distraction factor
road condition factor
darkness factor
existing crossing protection factor
number of persons injured
number of persons killed
special condition
number of main line tracks
total number of tracks or rating factor
number of passenger trains traversing the
crossing in a 24-hour period
quadrant visibility factor
number of trains traversing the crossing
in a 24-hour period
number of trains per day exceeding 25 mph




number of switching movements traversing the
crossing in a 24-hour period
stopping sight distance
number of through freights traversing the
crossing in a 24-hour period
terrain factor
train type and speed factor
user factor
number of vehicles traversing the crossing in




Warrants represent various criteria for the justification of im-
proved crossing protection. W. A. McLaughlin, with replies from all but
six of the 48 states, determined that 17 states use numerical warrants
for grade-crossing protection. (26)
For federal-aid highways the United States Bureau of Public Roads
requires all grade crossings witht a) multiple main line railroad tracks;
b) multiple track crossings with or without main tracks on which more than
one train may occupy the crossing at a time; c) single or multiple track
crossings where the train operating speeds are 70 raph or greater and sight
distances are restricted; to be protected with flashing light signals with
short arm gates.
A general numerical warrant recommended by the Bureau and used by
seven states is as follows:
1. Flashing lights are to be installed on new construction and
existing grades when the cross product of ADT and TPD (15 years
hence) is between 1,500 and 5,000.
2. Short arm gates and flashing lights are to be installed on
new construction and at existing grades where the highway
traffic exceeds 2,000 ADT (15 years hence) or where product
of TPD and ADT (15 years hence) is greater than 5,000 for single
line tracks or exceeds 3,000 for double line tracks.
Arkansas uses its hazard rating formula and has established numerical
warrants. California, Idaho, and Utah also have established numerical
warrants based on their individual formulas.
Illinois considers signalization when the cross product of ADT and
TPD is 3»000. They also base their warrant on an economic criteria.
Indiana's general warrants are discussed in the Introduction. Michigan
14
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uses subjective judgment except that no crossing vd.ll be signalized that
has less than 400 ADT or four or less TPD. Nine states use the Peabody
and Diramick nomograph shown in Figure 1. (31)
Prediction Formulas
The prediction of accident frequency is useful both in the determina-
tion of crossing warrants and for the economic justification of crossing
protection.
The prediction equation proposed by Peabody and Dimmick is as
follows: (31)
Pc p0.171
where I = probable number of accidents in a 10-year period,
a,b,c, = exponential constants,
H = ADT, motor vehicles,
T = number of trains per day,
P = protection coefficient, and
K = an additional parameter to account for variability
(approximately 33 percent of the estimate).
The engineers of the Oregon State Highway Department predict acci-
dents for a 5-year period by using the graph shown in Figure 2. (30)
The regression analysis performed by the Armour Research Institute
resulted in the following formula: (7)
Y = 0.701 X^ + 0.830XQ2 + 0.975X03 + O.^X^ - 0.042X1
2 2 2
- 0.97^X2 - O.O65X3 + 0.C&7X-L + O.O23X2 - O.OI3X3
0. o&jx^Xg - 0.023x^X3 + 0.200X2X3
where Y = expected number of accidents for a l6-year period,
Xq-, =1, Xq2 = Xqo = Xq^ = for painted crossbucks,
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PREDICTED ACCIDENTS (°2) ( five year total)
FIG. 2 OREGON STATE ACCIPENT PREDICTION CURVE
(SOURCE 1 OREGON STATE HIGHWAY DEPT. , TECH MCAL REPORT NO. 56-3 , GRADE
CROSSINGS ON STATE AND FEDERAL AID HIGHWAYS.")
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Xqo = 1, Xqi = Xq2 = Xq^ = for automatic flashers,
X^ = 1, XQ. = XQ2 = XQ« = for automatic gates,
Xn, = rated visibility of each quadrant, for good,
0.25 for fair, and 0.50 for poor,
X2 = highway volume evaluated as follows:
ADT Xg
100 or less 1
100 to ^00 2
400 to 1000 3
1000 to 3000 4
3000 or more 5
X- = number of tracks (maximum of four).
Protection Standards
The crossing protection devices investigated in this study have
been standardized and receive the combined approval of the Association of
American Railroads and the Bureau of Public Roads. (3» 6, 36) These
standards are described in Appendix A.
The American Association of State Highway Officials has established
the following design criteria: (2)
1. National uniformity of warrant criteria exists in the agreement
that the degree of grade crossing protection should be based
upon the daily exposure factor.
2. Protective devices should be clearly visible at a distance at
least equal to the stopping distance required.
3. Roadway gradient should be flat at and adjacent to the railroad
crossing.




5. In other than flat terrain, it may be necessary to rely on
speed control signs and warning devices.
6. Sight distance along the railroad tracks should be 13.5 times
the train speed for a single-unit highway vehicle and 17.5 times
the train speed for a 50-foot combination highway vehicle.
Factor Analysis
Factor analysis is an analytical tool which permits a parsimonious
description of a given set of variables by resolving the variables
linearly into a smaller number of factors. J. Versace in his article
discussing factor analysis as a tool for accident analysis wrote:
"There is no one cause of accidents. Instead, there are
innumerable influences acting at any instant, and for all we
know there may even be a residual component of causelessness.
The fact that there is a great number of influences should
direct us to explore techniques that will seek to find group-
ings of these influences that have something in common. This
common element then would take on a significance of its own
and allow us to consider a smaller number of more comprehen-
sive ideas instead of individual influences." (38)
Factor analysis has been used as an analytical tool in the field of
traffic engineering in two recent speed studies. Reliable prediction
equations were developed by the factors generated from the multitude of
variables investigated. Factor analysis also is used to obtain addi-





An initial decision in this study was to decide the nature of the
crossings to be analysed. Several previous studies considered only cross-
ings which had accidents with the result that coefficients of the result-
ing formulas were based primarily on the variability in the number of
accidents. Such a study requires accident data over a long period of time
because it is extremely rare when more than one accident occurs at a parti-
cular crossing in a period of one or two years.
Because accident data were readily available for only two years,
1962 and 1963» and so that more meaningful correlations could be developed,
accident locations were compared to non-accident locations. The 239 acci-
dent locations, which included most of the rural crossings in Indiana with
at least one accident in 1962 and 1963, were established by using the
traffic accident reports of the Indiana State Police. The 2*4-1 non-acci-
dent locations were randomly selected in the following manner:
1. The railroad lines were outlined on a state map;
2. Railroad mileage for each county was measured on the map;
3. By simple proportion based on railroad mileage, each county was
allocated a number of the total non-accident locations to be
investigated; and
*+. The selected number of railroad crossings in each county was
selected from county maps.
To ascertain that each non-accident crossing represented an acci-
dent-free location, the nearest available residents to the crossing were
asked about accidents at the proposed study location. If an accident
50
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h8d occurred at the location, the crossing was eliminated from the
analysis. The railroads also checked their records for accidents at
these non-accident locations. The contact with residents W8S also valu-
able in another way. They often supplied needed information regarding the
installation dates of new protective devices.
Many possible variables were selected and all those which could be
realistically evaluated were investigated. Many variables were evaluated
subjectively by use of dichotomous values (0 or 1 value representing
absence or existence of a situation).
The information for the 56 selected variables came primarily from
three separate sources: police accident reports; field investigations;
and railroad correspondence. These variables and the equipment used for
their measurement are given in the following description of the variables.
Appendix B contains a photograph of the equipment along with a sample field
data sheet. In the following lists the variable name is followed by the
method of coding or the units of measurement.
Description of the Variables
From Accident Report Data (Accident Locations Only)
1. Vehicle type (Coded if car, 1 if truck).
2. Age of vehicle - years.
3. Out-of-county vehicles (Coded if in-county, 1 if out-of-county).
The vehicle registration or owner's address was used to determine
the origin of the vehicle.
b. Out-of-state vehicle (Coded if in-state, 1 if out-of-state).
5. Number of occupants - driver plus passengers. This variable was
included because of the possible distraction caused by passengers.
6. Actual car speed - raph. The speed of the car was not always
listed on the accident report. The car speed was then
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established by driving the approach to the crossing at the speed
the investigator considered a maximum safe speed for the highway
and subtracting 10 mph.
7. Actual train speed - mph.
8. Vehicle defects (Coded if no defects, 1 if defects were indicat-
ed). This variable indicated the officer's opinion of whether or
not mechanical defects were a contributing factor to the accident.
9-11. Surface type - portland cement concrete, asphalt, or gravel
(Coded if absent, 1 if present for each type). These three
variables were also applicable to the non-accident locations and
the data for them were obtained from field observations.
12. Dry pavement (Coded if dry, 1 if wet or had ice or snow).
13. Ice or snow (Coded if dry, 1 if ice or snow).
1*4-. Clear weather (Coded if clear, 1 if cloudy).
15. Darkness (Coded if daylight, 1 if darkness). This variable was
defined as darkness if the accident occurred between 6:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m.
16. Window position (Coded if window down, 1 if window rolled up).
Often the officers reported the windows were up (and/or radio
playing), and driver possibly could not hear either the warning
bells or train whistle. If the accident report did not indicate
this information, the time of day, time of year, and reported
weather conditions were used as guides.
17. Drinking driver (Coded if not drinking, 1 if drinking).
18. Male-female driver (Coded if female, 1 if male).
19. Driver age - years.
CiiCi
2k
20. Personal injury (Coded if no personal injury, 1 if personal
injury). The number of personal injuries involved in an acci-
dent was not recorded because of the obvious strong relation-
ship to number of passengers. A fatality was considered a
personal injury for this variable.
21. Fatality (Coded if no fatality, 1 if fatality). The number
of deaths was not recorded because of the relationship to number
of passengers.
22-28. Day of the week (Coded if not on a certain day, 1 if on
the day).
Field Data (All Locations)
The data obtained at a grade crossing were measured on the approaches
where an accident occurred at accident locations and on one randomly selected
approach each for vehicles and trains at non-accident locations. Variables





33« No protection. (No gate, flasher, or crossbuck.)
3^. Stop sign.
35 • White edge line.
36. Highway gradient - percent. This variable was measured with a
hand-level and Chicago self-supporting rod, recorded by sign to
the nearest 0.1 percent.
37. Railroad gradient - coded same as variable number 36.
38. Highway curvature - degree. This variable was measured by taking
the offset in inches at the center of a 62-foot chord attached to
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nails driven in the center of the highway.
39. Railway curvature - degree, measured same as variable number 38
(chord attached to rails with a magnet).
40. Number of tracks - pairs.
41. Pavement width - feet.
42. Advance warning sign (Coded if not existing, 1 if existing).
43. Pavement crossing markings (Coded if not existing, 1 if existing).
44. Number of businesses. This variable represents the number of
business establishments located a distance of one-half mile along
the approach to the crossing on both sides of the roadway.
45. Number of advertising signs - measured similarly to variable
number 44.
46. Presence of minor obstructions (Coded if not obstructed, 1 if
partially obstructed). This variable considered such things as
brush or trees which would hinder the view of an approaching
train but would not completely block its view.
47. Number of houses - measured similarly to variable number 44.
48. Line of sight - coded by sine of angle. This variable repre-
sents the angle at which a motorist could first view an approach-
ing train when the vehicle is at a distance from the crossing
equal to the stopping sight distance as determined either by
the speed limit or maximum safe speed of the highway. The sine
of the angle included between the highway and the first view of
an approaching train was recorded to three decimal places. A
hand compass was used to measure this angle.
49. Intersection angle - degree. This variable was measured with
a hand compass and coded to the nearest five degrees.
51
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Railroad Correspondence Data (All Locations)
50. Average number of passenger trains per day.
51. Average number of freight trains per day.
52. Average freight train speed - mph.
53. Average passenger train speed - mph.
5^. Total number of trains - TPD.
Vehicular Traffic Data (All Locations)
55. Average daily traffic - ADT. The files of the Indiana State
Highway Commission were used as a reference for collection of
these data.
56. Average car speed - mph. Determined as described in discussion
of variable number 6.
Analysis of the Data
All data were punched on IBM cards for the various statistical analyses.
The schematic diagram shown in Figure 3 outlines the analytical approach
used in this research investigation.
Two factor analyses were performed to develop descriptive explana-
tions of the grade crossing characteristics. Orthogonal principal factors
were generated in decreasing order of their contribution to the total
variance. Factor analysis reduces a multi-variable correlation matrix to
a common factor matrix. Because a factor is e measure of several variables,
the resulting factor matrix has fewer dimensions. Since the factors are
orthogonal, they are independent of one another. To facilitate the inter-
pretation of the generated factors, the coordinate system is rotated until
the variance for each factor is maximized.
After the factor analyses were performed, the dependent variables
representing accidents were functionally related to the factors by means





































FIGURE 3 - FLOW DIAGRAM
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developed try solving the following equations expressed in matrix notation.
The first equation was used to develop the factor scores to permit evalua-
tion of factors for values of the variables while the second equation cor-
related the dependent variable with the factors.
E = A F'y-2P
where E = factor-score matrix,
A = varimax matrix,
P = principal-factor matrix, and
y = diagonal matrix of latent roots,
c = Er'
where c = column vector of regression coefficients,
E = factor-score matrix, and
r = r.ow vector of correlation coefficients for the
dependent variable correlated with the independent
variables.
The dependent variables for the factor analysis performed on the
accident locations only were accident rate as determined by the inverse of
the ADT and total exposure represented by the inverse of the product of
train volume and vehicular volume. For the combined data factor analysis,
the dependent variable was accident occurrence, a dichotomous variable
representing occurrence or non-occurrence of an accident (coded if
non-accident location, 1 if en accident location).
Regression analysis was performed on 28 variables common to both
accident and non-accident locations. Three other common variables - rail-
way gradient, stop sign, and no protection - were not included due to in-
sufficient data. The "buildup" regression routine allowed the ordering
of variables which thus eliminated confusing interpretation. In general,





The linear regression model for factor analysis utilizes the regres-
sion coefficients between the dependent variable and the various factors.
IH = H + sC^F-l + c2F2 +...+ c^ + cU)
where IH = index of hazard,
H = grand mean of the hazard,
s = standard deviation of hazard,
c. = common factor coefficient,
( j = 1, 2, . . . , m),
n
F =T" e. .Z. = K . = common factor
ti = 1, 2, ..., n; j = 1, 2, ..., m),
8i i = standard regression coefficient for j-th factor score
(i = 1» 2, ..., n; j = 1, 2, ..., m),
I* - independent variable (i = 1, 2, ..., n),
K. = residual variable for j-th factor score
(j = 1, 2, ... , m),
c = unique factor coefficient,
D = unique factor,
m = number of common factors, and
n = number of independent variables.
The linear regression model for regression analysis is as follows:
IH = a + b^ + bgXg + ...+ bRx^ + Q
where IH = index of hazard,
a = intercept,
bj_ = regression coefficient (i = 1, 2, ..., n),
x. = independent variable (i = 1, 2, ..., n),
Q = residual variable, and
n = number of independent variables.
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The index of hazard referred to in the factor analysis is the
functional relationship between the independent variables and the gener-
ated factors. The index of hazard for the regression analysis is the




Solutions to the proposed mathematical models for estimating apparent
hazard at a railroad grade crossing are presented and discussed according
to the statistical techniques employed. A factor analysis was performed
on the 56 variables which described the 289 accident locations. The re-
sulting factors were then correlated with dependent variables representing
accident hazard. Another factor analysis was performed on the 28 variables
--
that were descriptive of both accident and non-accident locations. These
factors were then correlated with accident occurrence as the dependent
variable. Several regression analyses were also performed to express
hazard in terms of the influencing independent variables.
Means and standard deviations of the study variables are presented
in Tables 7 and 11 in Appendices C and D, respectively. Factors are
denoted with letters, and variables numerically, to facilitate referencing
throughout the text.
Summary Statistics
Twenty-five of the 56 variables investigated in this study pertained
->; only to the accident locations. The remaining 31 variables described both
accident and non-accident locations. The following statistical summary
was developed from the at-grade highway-railway crossings analysed in this
research investigation.
1. Driver characteristics.
a. Driver age - The average age of all drivers involved in a
grade crossing accident was 36 years.
b. Driver sex - 86 percent of these drivers were male.
GO
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c. Driver residence - 72 percent of the drivers were from the
county in which the accident occurred. Ninety-four percent
of the drivers were residents of the State of Indiana.
d. Number of occupants - The average number of occupants was
I.36 persons per vehicle.
e. Drinking driver - Only six percent of the accident reports
indicated that the driver had been drinking.
f
.
Personal injury - 62 percent of the accidents resulted in
at least one personal injury.
g. Fatality - l^l- percent of the accidents resulted in at least
one fatality.
Vehicle characteristics.
a. Vehicle type - 27 percent of the accident vehicles were
trucks.
b. Age of vehicle - The average age of vehicles involved in
grade crossing accidents was 5.2 years.
c. Vehicle defects - 17 percent of the vehicles evidenced
contributing mechanical defects.
d. Window position - 71 percent of the vehicles were considered
to have had their windows rolled up at the time of the
accident.
e. Actual car speed - The average of the reported car speeds
of vehicles involved in accidents was Zk mph.
f Actual train speed - The average of the reported speeds
of trains involved in accidents was ^1 mph.
Environmental characteristics.




b. Darkness - 36 percent of the accidents occurred at night.
c. Pavement surface moisture - Pavements were dry 57 percent,
wet 16 percent, and had ice or snow 27 percent of the time
that accidents occurred.









The following data were collected at both accident and non-accident
locations. They represent the geometric and traffic characteristics that






a. Horizontal curvature 0.23 Deg. 0.14 Deg.
b. Vertical alinement 1.056 1.0$
c. Pavement width 19.7 ft. 17.2 ft.
d. Pavement type:
Portland Cement Concrete 7$ 156
Asphalt 75% 43$
Gravel 18$ ^
e. Intersection angle 94 Deg. 90 Deg.
S2
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Occident Location Factor Analysis
In an attempt to determine the underlying causes of highway-railroad
grade crossing accidents, the 5° variables previously identified and dis-
cussed were factor analysed. Twenty-one significant factors with a latent
root of 1.0 or greater were generated. The correlation matrix was factor-
ized by the principal-axis technique with ones inserted in the main
diagonal of the matrix. The value of 1.0 for the terminal latent root was
arbitrarily established for the selection of the significant factors. The
i
contribution of these factors to an explanation of the total variance of
the variables is shown in Table 12, Appendix C, to be approximately 70
i
percent. This factor matrix affords a parsimonious description of the
56-dimensional space representing the original variables.
The orthogonal factors were rotated by the varimax technique to
facilitate physical interpretation of the common factors. The principal-
axis solution was thus transformed into the more understandable form repre-
sented by the rotated-factor matrix in Table 11, Appendix C.
In general, only variables with factor coefficients of +.300 or
greater were used to interpret the factors. Variables with smaller load-
ing values were occasionally considered because they complemented the
identification. An interpretive name, description and the important con-
tributing variables with their respective factor coefficients are listed
below.
A. Major railroad facility. This factor describes the conditions
characteristic of an important railroad operation.
40 - Number of tracks, +.608
51 - Number of passenger trains, +.665
52 - Number of freight trains, +.797
53 - Average train speed, +.301
5^ - Total number of trains, +.847
64
38
I. Inadequate alinement. The restrictive vertical and horizontal
alinements with associated low vehicular speeds identifies this
catagory of crossing environment.
6 - Actual car speed, -.399
9 - Portland cement concrete, -.314
36 - Highway gradient, +.665
37 - Railway gradient, +.35^
38 - Highway curvature, +.406
39 - Railway curvature, +.236
48 - Sine of angle of view, +.522
56 - Average car speed, -.346
J. Female driver. Wonen who have consumed alcoholic beverages are
normally not found driving vehicles on the highway.
17 - Alcohol, -.648
13 - Male driver, -.598
33 - No protective device, -.736
K. Truck traffic. All of these variables combined represent typical
truck travel.
1 - Truck, +.448
2 - Vehicle age, +.369
5 - Number of occupants, -.773
18 - Male driver, +.233
38 - Highway curvature, -.344
L. An interpretative name could not be assigned for this factor.
27 _ Saturday, -.300
28 - Sunday, +.802
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M. High-speed railroad location. All variables suggest high-speed
train operations.
7 - Actual train speed, +.699
39 - Railway curvature, -.312
50 - Average freight train speed, +.869
51 - Number of passenger trains, +.454
53 - Average train speed, +.864
54 - Total number of trains, +.300
N. An interpretive name could not be assigned for this factor.
1 - Trucks, -.327
26 _ Friday, +.815
27 - Saturday, +.362
0. An interpretive name could not be assigned for this factor.
22 - Monday, +.763
27 - Saturday, -.425
38 - Highway curvature, -.333
P. An interpretive name could not be assigned for this factor.
25 - Thursday, +.832
27 - Saturday, -.404
Q. An interpretive name could not be assigned for this factor.
23 - Tuesday, -.843
27 - Saturday, +.353
39 - Railway curvature, -.378




3 - Out-of-county, -.730
4 - Out-of-state, -.766
37 - Railway gradient, -.358
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matrix is presented in Table 13, Appendix C, and the correlation coef-
ficients in Table 3-
The factors identified es local-service road, secondary highway,
and female drivers correlated significantly with accident rate. While
all factors explained 19 percent of the variation in accident rate, these
three factors accounted for 16 percent. The unexplained percentage is
due to measurement errors, the absence of important variables that were
not identified or measured such as driver characteristics and, probably,
in large part to the element of chance.
A positive correlation was observed between accident rate and local-
service road. Because such facilities carry low traffic volumes, the
accident rate at the accident-only locations was high. For the same rea-
son, Factor C, secondary highway, which represents surfaced highways which
serve both through and local traffic, correlated negatively with accident
rate. Secondary highways do not have a high accident rate because they
carry a high traffic volume. The female driver, as represented by Factor J,
had a negative correlation with accident rate. Women who have consumed
alcoholic beverages normally are accompanied by a male who does the driv-
ing. Women drivers seldom drive on the low-class roads where no protective
devices are found.
To gain further insight into the highway-railway grade crossing
accident problem, the 21 factors representing accident-only locations were
correlated with some measure of total exposure. In this case, total ex-
posure was defined as the inverse of product of the daily train volume,
TPD, and daily vehicular volume, ADT. The results of this correlation
are presented in Table 4. Factors B and J, local-service road and female
driver, correlated similarly with exposure as they did with accident rate.
Major railroad facility, Factor A, correlated negatively with exposure.
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TARLE 3
CORRELATION OF ACCIDENT RATE WITH THE FACTORS






























CORRELATION OF EXPOSURE WITH THE FACTORS































The relatively large number of exposures resulting in one accident for
each location of this classification resulted in the negative correlation.
These four factors explained 16 percent of the variation in total exposure
while only an additional three percent was explained by the remaining 17
factors.
Combined Location Factor Analysis
The previous factor analysis was performed on data representing acci-
dent locations only to identify those characteristics related to accident
situations. To obtain a realistic measure of hazard, a factor analysis
was performed on 28 variables common to both accident and non-accident
locations. The variables representing no protection, stop signs and rail-
road gradient were eliminated because of insufficient data.
Ten significant factors with a latent root of 1.0 or greater were
generated. As shown in Table 16 , Appendix D, the contribution of these
factors to the total variance of the variables accounted for 70 percent
of the variance. Means and standard deviations of the study variables,
the rotated-factor matrix, the correlations of accident occurrence with
the other variables and the factor-score matrix are also in Appendix D.
The ten common factors that were generated are described below:
AA. Local-service road. All variables which describe this factor
indicate local access roads.
9 - Portland cement concrete, -.371
29 - Crossbuck, +.355
31 - Flashers, -.740
35 - White edge line, -.702
4l - Pavement width, -.732
44 - Number of businesses,
-.359
45 - Number of advertising signs, -.637
55 - ADT, -.802 70
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BB. Major railroad facility. These variables reflect movement of
many trains at relatively high speeds.
40 - Number of tracks, +.536
50 - Freight train speed, +.510
51 - Number of passenger trains, +.805
52 - Number of freight trains, +.868
53 - Average train speed, +.610
54 _ Total number of trains, +.938
CC. Skewed crossing. This factor suggests travel on a major road
vdth the railroad crossing at a wide intersection angle.
42 - Advance warning sign, +.513
43 - Pavement crossing marking, +.647
46 - Minor obstructions, +.540
49 - Intersection angle, +.820
DD. Secondary highway. The highway type described by these variables
serves both local and through traffic.
9 - Portland cement concrete, -.315
10 - Asphalt, +.960
11 - Gravel, -.859
41 - Pavement width, +.302
47 - Number of houses, +.329
EE. Minimum protection. The dominance of painted crossbucks explains
these crossings.
29 - Painted crossbuck, +.858
30 - Reflectorized crossbuck, -.929
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FF. Distractions. This factor is described by the roadside develop-
ment which may distract the drivers.
44 - Number of businesses, +.710
45 - Number of advertising signs, +.451
47 - Number of houses, +.644
56 - Average car speed, -.585
GG. Inadequate alinement. Restrictive vertical and horizontal aline-
ment variables constitute this factor.
36 - Highway gradient, +.501
38 - Highway curvature, +.751
39 - Railway curvature, +.508
56 - Average car speed, -.320
HH. Low speed railroad location. The low train speeds and volume
indicated by these variables describe a minor railroad operation.
39 - Railway curvature, +.400
50 - Freight train speed, -.743
53 - Average train speed, -.701
II. Inadequate visual warning. These variables suggest lack of view
prior to the crossings.
36 - Highway gradient, -.434
42 - Advance warning sign, -.318
46 - Minor obstructions, +.611
48 - Sine of line-of-sight angle, -.740
JJ. Protected crossing. This factor represents the use of a physical
barrier when trains are present.
9 - Portland cement concrete, +.296
32 - Gates, +.916
40 - Number of tracks, +.303
id
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These ten factors were then correlated with accident occurrence;
that is, whether or not an accident occurred at the crossing location.
As shown in Table 5» the dominant factors, local-service road, major
railroad facility, secondary highway and distractions explained 22 per-
cent of the variation in accident occurrence. All factors explained
24 percent of the variation in accident occurrence. The coefficients for
the four factors are approximately equal. Thus, each factor contributes
approximately the same amount to the crossing hazard as measured by acci-
dent occurrence.
In the accident-locations-only factor analysis, the local-service
road factor correlated positively with accident rate. Because local-
service roads carry low traffic volumes, an accident at such a crossing
reflects a high accident rate. However, in this factor analysis, local-
service road was negatively related to accident occurrence thus confirm-
ing that an accident is relatively infrequent at each crossing of this
type.
The major railroad facility factor contributed importantly to acci-
dent occurrence. Inspection of the correlations between the variables
and the factor reveals that train volume correlates higher than train
speed. Number of tracks is also highly correlated with this factor.
The secondary highway factor influenced materially to accident
occurrence. Distractions, as represented by Factor FF, partially ex-
plained accident occurrence. The driver's attention apparently is divert-
ed to the houses, businesses, advertising signs, etc., that exist along
the approach to the railroad crossing. As a result, inadequate time
remains to see the train or warning device.
Based on the model previously discussed in the Procedure, an estimate
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The values of these variables must be reduced to standard-score form for
the solution of these equations. This reduction is accomplished with the
following relationship:
Z = (X -X)/s
where Z = standard score,
X = observed value,
X* = mean of the variable, and
s = standard deviation of the variable.
Regression Analysis
The multiple linear regression analysis utilized in this research
investigation is often referred to as "buildup" or "stepwise" regression.
The independent variables were selected in order of their ability to pre-
dict the dependent variable. However, the program allowed the ordering
of the variables and thus permitted the development of practical models.
For all equations , train and highway traffic volumes were ordered to per-
mit their inclusion in the multiple regression expressions.
The regression analyses were performed on the 28 variables measured
at both accident and non-accident locations. The dependent variable for
each equation was accident occurrence; that is, whether or not an acci-
dent occurred at the location during the two-year study period.
An equation was developed to account for the various protection de-
vices, train and highway volumes and those additional variables which
significantly influenced accident occurrence. This analysis produced the
following prediction equation:
2. IH = +0.1^9 -0.376X2
9
-0.300X
3Q -0.383Xo1 -0.331Xo2 •K>.082XiK)
+0.0223XZ+1 -fO.OllX^. +O.01^2Xc5 +0.02%^
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where IH = index of hazard (accident occurrence)
Xpg = presence of a painted crossbuck (0, 1),
Xoq = presence of a reflectorized crossbuck (0, 1),
X„ = presence of a flasher (0, l),
X~2
= presence of a gate (0, 1),
XhQ = number of track pairs,
X^.1 = pavement v/idth in feet,
X^ = TPD,
l,r = ADT/1000, and
X_ = sum of distractions.
In addition to the protection variables, Equation 2 also includes
variables which are a measure of train and highway volumes. The type of
rail and highway operations are represented by the variables designated
as number of track pairs and pavement width. The number of roadside
distractions also proved significant, confirming the results of the factor
analysis. The sum of the three distraction variables, houses, businesses
and advertising signs, was more significant in this equation than the
individual distraction variables. The coefficient of determination, R
,
for Equation 2 was 19.3 percent.
The regression coefficients of the four protective devices were
remarkably similar. It might be inferred from this fact that hazard was
relatively independent of the type of protective device. To ascertain
the statistical significance of the coefficients for the protection
variables, a second multiple regression equation was developed which
excluded the four types of crossing protection and included the remain-
ing variables. The coefficient of determination for Equation 3>








Multiple Correlation Coefficient = 0.193















* A fold-out key to these variables is presented in Appendix D.
** X_ is equal to sum of X^, xkc» and %o«
31
53
3. IH = 0.185 + 0.079XiK) + O.OZIX/^ + O.OllX^ + 0.013X55
+ 0.024X
5
•where IH = index of hazard,
Xji^q = number of track pairs,
Xu-, = pavement width in feet,
X^ = TPD,
X„ = ADT/1000, and
X = sum of distractions.
The F-test presented below was used to test the hypothesis that the
coefficients for the four protective devices as presented in Equation 2
were not significantly different from zero.
F =
(Rk- 4 )/(k - r )
(i - r£)/(n - k - i)
where F = calculated F value,
2
R. = multiple coefficient of determination for the
original equation,
2
R = multiple coefficient of determination for the
equation without the test variables,
k = number of independent variables in the original
equation,
r = number of independent variables in the equation
without the test variables, and
N = number of observations.
The calculated F value for this data was obtained as follows:
(1 -0.193)/(530 - 9 - 1) lmbL
The critical value for a 95-porc©nt level of significance with (k-4) = 4
and (N-k-1) = 520 degrees of freedom is 2.39. Because the calculated
value is less than the critical value, the hypothesis that the protection
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* A fold-out key to these variables is presented in Appendix D.
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warrants are based on current levels of protection. Painted crossbucks
were not included in the nomograph because all crossbucks are required to
be reflectorized by state law. Although many painted crossbucks are
presently in service, these devices are to be replaced with reflectorized
crossbucks when necessary.
The index of hazard and minimum protection warranted for the example
shown on Figure 4 is determined in the following manner;
Given: TPD = 6; ADT = 4000; 2 track pairs; 20 ft. pavement width; and
10 roadside distractions.
1. Draw a line extending from 6 trains per day through 4/1000 ADT
to turning line A.
2. From the intersection point on line A, a line is drawn through
2 track pairs and extended to turning line B.
3. From this point of intersection, a line is drawn through 20 ft.
pavement width and extended until it intersects turning line C.
4. After connecting this point on line C to the 10 roadside distrac-
tions, the index of hazard and minimum type of protection war-
ranted is found at the intersection of this line with the index
of hazard scale.
To check the adequacy of Equation 3» the average calculated indices
of hazard for the crossings studies were compared to the actual hazard
as defined by the number of accident locations, A, per number of locations








Painted crossbuck 0.502 155/320 0.484 0.018 3
Reflectorized
crossbuck 0.523 66/115 0.574 0.051 9






The following conclusions concerning hazard at railroad-highway grade
crossings summarize the findings of this research investigation. As
actual accident locations were compared to a random sample of non-acci-
dent locations, these results can reasonably be applied to all rural
grade crossings within the State of Indiana.
1. The accident victims are predominantly young male drivers
residing in the county in which the accident occurred. They
are usually traveling alone and not under the influence of
alcohol. More than one half of them are injured, and about one
out of seven are killed.
2. Trucks account for more than one quarter of the accident
vehicles. Seventeen percent of all vehicles involved in
accidents have evidence of mechanical defects. The pos-
sibility of the driver hearing a warning bell or train whistle
is reduced because the windows are closed on most vehicles. The
majority of accidents occur at relatively low car speeds and at
moderate train speeds.
3. Most accidents occur during the favorable driving conditions of
clear weather, daylight hours, and dry pavements. However, the
number of accidents per unit time and per unit exposure is
probably greater for ice and snow conditions and for wet pave-
ments than for dry pavement conditions.
4. The regression equation, generated by factor analysis (Equation 1),
relates accident occurrence to four factors which were identified
33
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as local-service road, major railroad facility, secondary
highway, and distractions. All four factors accounted for
approximately the same amount of variation, which totaled 22
percent, in accident occurrence.
5> The type of protection is not important as a variable in the
equations developed by regression analysis for the prediction
of index of hazard.
6. The regression equation developed by the multiple linear regres-
sion technique (Equation 3) identifies number of track pairs,
highway pavement width, train volume, average daily traffic
volume, and the sum of distractions (number of houses, businesses,
and advertising signs) as important variables for the prediction
of index of hazard. This equation explains 18 percent of the
variation in accident occurrence.
7. Warrants for the installation of protective devices at rail-
highway crossings, based on the current standard of protection
used in Indiana, are indices of hazard of below 0.65 for reflector-
ized crossbucks, O.65 to 0.80 for flashers, and above 0.80 for
gates. These values are applicable for crossings rated by
Equation 3»
8. Prediction of index of hazard is possible with Equation 1 which
was developed with factor analysis. However, the simplicity of
Equation 3 developed by multiple linear regression techniques and
its almost equal dependability makes it more practical to use.
9. This investigation of many roadway, railroad, traffic, and environ-
mental variables permitted only an explanation of approximately 20
percent of accident occurrence. This finding lends support to the
conclusion of many authors that railroad-highway grade crossing
09
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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The railroad-highway grade crossing involves a large and important
area of accident prevention. This thesis did not attempt to cover com-
pletely the entire topic. Therefore, the following suggestions ere offer-
ed as possibilities for further research.
1. This study analyzed rural locations only. The total number of
railroad-highway grade crossing accidents are approximately
distributed evenly between rural and urban areas. A similar
study on urban locations is probably warranted. An urban
study should include such additional variables as illumination,
stop sign control, coordinated traffic signal control, and
other variables pertinent to urban locations.
2. Investigation of the non-linearity in the parameters and/or the
variables may offer increased precision in the estimation of
hazard. The equations presented in this research assume linear
relationships.
3. Prompt investigation of accidents may yield valuable information
regarding driver behavior. Data concerning the causes of
driver carelessness would permit better driver education
programming
.
4. Experimentation and analysis of stop sign and traffic signal
control versus flashers or gates, especially in urban areas,
may offer an increased measure of protection. Previous studies
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W-32-RAILROAD ADVANCE WARNING SIGN
BACKGROUND-HIGHWAY YELLOW
BORDER, SYMBOL, AND LETTERING - BLACK
REFLECTORIZED BY REFLECTOR BUTTONS
IN SYMBOL AND LETTERS r OR BY "REFLECTING
COATING" BACKGROUND
P-7210
FIGURE 8 ADVANCE WARNING SIGN STANDARD
(SOIRCE: "RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR RAILROAD - HIGH WAY GRADE CROSSING
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A. No. of Tracks
E. Pavement Width
C. Roadway Warning 3ign_
D. Roadside Warning 3ign_
E. Number of Roadside Businesses
F. Number of Advertising Signs
G.
H.














MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE STUDY VARIABLES
Standard Standard
Variable* Mean Deviation Variable* Mean Deviation
1 0.2664 0.4429 29 0.5294 0.5000
2 5.183 4.480 30 0.2284 0.4205
3 0.2803 0.4940 31 0.1765 0.3819
4 0.0623 0.2421 32 0.0415 0.1998
5 1.360 0.9025 33 0.0173 0.1306
6 24.14 18.40 34 0.0969 0.3078
7 40.62 22.40 35 0.1038 0.3055
8 0.1730 0.3789 36 0.8782 1.630
9 0.0727 0.2600 37 -0.0066 0.2376
10 0.7474 0.4352 38 0.2318 1.404
11 0.1834 0.3877 39 0.1488 0.7786
12 0.5744 0.4953 40 1.429 0.7091
13 0.2734 0.4465 41 19.72 6.096
H+ 0.7405 0.4391 42 0.6851 0.6410
15 0.3633 0.4318 43 0.0969 0.4137
16 0.7059 0.4564 44 1.609 1.980
17 0.0588 0.2357 45 0.6471 1.404
18 O.8650 0.4320 46 0.6990 0.6842
19 36.30 15.^5 47 3.080 3.077
20 0.6228 0.4855 48 0.5824 0.372
21 0.1384 0.3459 49 94.13 73.98
22 0.1419 0.3495 50 40.29 14.78
23 0.1453 0.3530 51 2.941 3.060
24 0.1177 0.3228 52 9.834 7.123
25 0.1557 0.3632 53 44.19 16.60
26 0.1626 0.3697 5^ 12.976 9.776
27 0.1557 0.3632 55 1,185 2,357
28 0.1176 0.3228 56 39.16 12.20




CORRELATION OF ACCIDENT-RATE WITH THE OTHER VARIABLES
Correlation Correlation
Variable* Coefficient Variable* Coefficient
1 •.0437 29 -.0266
2 +.0956 30 +.0662
3 -.0011 31 -.1779
4 -.0660 32 -.0744
5 +.0299 33 +.4160
6 -.0349 34 -.0661
7 +.1441 35 -.1311
8 +.0151 36 +.1143
9 -.0988 37 -.0085
10 -.2296 38 +.0547
11 +.2926 39 -.0260
12
-.0703 40 -.0283
13 -.0190 41 -.2869
14 -.0668 42
-.0877
15 -.0699 43 -.0583
16
-.0905 44 -.2005
17 +.0668 45 -.1398
18
-.0136 46 +.0395







23 -.0268 51 +.0577
24
-.0384 52 +.0386
25 +.0463 53 +.0617
26 +.0026 54 +.0439
27 +.1251 55 -.2079
28
-.0843 56 -.1117








Variable* Coefficient Variable* Coefficient
1 +.0620 29 -.0276
2 .0223 30 .0539
3 .0221 31 -.131**
4
-.0376 32 -.0523
5 +.0773 33 .4367
6 -.1004 34 -.0212
7 .1743 35 -.1074
8 .0122 36 +.0796
9 -.0770 37 -.0003
10
-.1732 38 .0367
11 .2505 39 -.0340
12
-.0353 40 +.1073
13 -.0140 41 -.2182
14 -.0610 42
-.0638
15 -.0288 ^3 +.0096
16 -.0026 44
-.1520
17 .0239 *5 -.1067
18 .0219 46 .0963
19 .0309 47 -.0978
20
-.0243 48 +.0805
21 -.0022 49 .0236
22
-.0115 50 +.1402





25 -.0196 53 .1907
26 .0124 5^ .3010
27 .1719 55 -.1535
28
-.0607 56 -.1296
* A fold-out key to these variables is presented in Appendix D.
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TABLE 11















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































* A fold-out key for these variables and factors is presented on page 92.
11
TABLE U( cont'd)

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE 21 PRINCIPAL FACTORS
Percent of Cum. Percent of
Factor* Eigenvalue Total Variance Total Variance
A 4.96 8.86 8.86
E 3.^3 6.14 15.00
C 2.65 ^.73 19.73
D 2.45 4.37 24.10
E 2.31 4.13 28.23
F 2.17 3.87 32.10
G 2.04 3.66 35.76
H 1.83 3.26 39.02
I 1.69 3.02 42.04
J 1.63 2.90 44.94
K 1.5? 2.81 ^7.75
L 1.51 2.69 50.44
M 1.39 2.48 52.92
N 1.34 2.40 55.32
1.31 2.33 57.65
P 1.23 2.19 59.84
Q 1.21 2.16 62.00
R 1.13 2.11 64.11
S 1.11 1.98 66.09
T 1.06 1.89 67.98
U 1.04 1.85 69.83
* A fold-out key to these factors is presented on page 92.
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TABLE 13















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE 10 PRINCIPAL FACTORS
Percent of Cum. Percent of
Factor* Eigenvalue Total Variance Total Variance
AA 4.19 14.96 14.96
BB 3.88 13.84 28.80
CC 1.97 7.04 35.84
DD 1.81 6.47 42.31
EE 1.70 6.08 48.39
FF 1.50 5.34 53.73
GG 1.29 4.61 5^.34
HH 1.18 4.22 62.56
II 1.07 3.83 66.39
JJ 1.04 3.71 70.10
* A fold-out key for these factors is presented in Appendix D.
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AA BB cc DD EE FF GG HH n JJ
9 -.1365 +.0807 -.1156 -.2150 -.0430 -.0556 -.0745 -.1760 +.2031 +.2454
10 +.0679 +.0080 -.0107 +.4945 +.0161 -.0255 +.0530 +.0062 -.0118 -.0665
11 -.0125 -.0407 +.0574 -.4201 +.0011 +.0523 -.0209 +.0664 -.0728 -.0357
29 +.0776 +.0217 +.0142 +.0341 +.5051 +.0044 -.0671 -.0413 +.0005 -.0961
30 +.0971 +.0039 +.0263 +.0011 -.5817 +.0003 -.0360 -.0917 -.0550 -.0769
31 -.2507 -.0080 -.0613 -.0357 -.0060 -.0055 +.0567 +.1541 +.0715 -.1628
32 +.0519 -.0533 +.0399 -.0106 -.0037 -.0161 +.0470 +.0256 -.0240 +.8313
35 -.2240 -.0793 +.0961 -.0255 +.0331 — O858 +.0362 +.1569 -.0232 +.0182
36 +.0202 -.0620 +.1124 -.0313 -.0290 +.0197 +.3732 +.1374 -.3162 +.0441
38 -.0197 -.0483 -.0492 +.0381 +.0081 -.0239 +.6021 +.0844 +.1260 +.0762
39 -.0938
,
-.0764 -.0313 +.0591 -.0233 -.1484 +.3999 -.2676 -.0243 -.0898
40 +.0517 +.1860 -.0134 +.0545 +.O665 +.0344 +.0021 -.1517 -.0481 +.2302
4i -.2143 +.0347 -.0681 +.0924 +.0428 -.1324 -.0237 -.0873 -.0189 +.0273
42
-.0275 -.1118 +.3233 +.0265 -.0206 -.0567 -.1418 +.2023 -.3030 +.0689
43
-.0542 +.0724 +.3401 -.0289 +.0539 +.0291 +.0331 -.1578 +.0145 -.0082
44
-.0495 -.0003 -.0215 -.0271 +.0388 +.4491 -.0785 -.0012 +.0172 -.0640
45 -.1663 -.0127 +.0964 -.1237 -.0277 +.2701 -.0073 -.0519 -.1237 +.0066
46 +.0604 +.0457 +.2405 -.0119 +.0506 -.0227 +.1180 -.0052 +.4151 +.0548
47 +.0759 -.0885 +.0205 +.0973 +.0065 +.4295 -.0942 +.1786 +.0289 +.0571
48
-.0084 +.0721 +.0341 -.0276 -.0043 -.0133 -.0313 -.1262 -.5390 +.0241
49 +.0449 +.0033 +.4604 -.0436 -.0516 +.0328 -.0312 +.0112 -.0290 -.0016
50
-.0525 +.0412 -.0899 -.0080 +.0211 -.0117 +.0660 +.4244 +.0579 -.0523
51 — OI65 +.2285
-.0371 +.0156 +.0247 -.0306 -.0140 +.0225 +.0235 +.0214
52
-.0162 +.3015 -.0006 -.0052 -.0359 -.0330 -.0697 -.1414 -.0447 -.1487
53
-.0349 +.0775 +.0162 -.0199 +.0270 +.0065 +.0689 +.3818 +.0493 -.0070
54 -.0029 +.3169 +.0967 -.0128 -.0098 -.0289 -.0396 -.1255 +.0222 -.0880
55 -.2626 +.0511 -.0113 -.0775 +.0257 -.0060 +.0543 -.0810 -.0356 -.0483
56 -.0970 -.0459 -.0235 +.1404 +.0388 -.4281 -.1892 +.0636 +.0664 +.0576
A fold-out key for these factors and variables is presented in Appendix D.
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APPENDIX E
Typical Installations
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APPENDIX F
Field Observations
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